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Abstract
Group membership affects an agent’s individual behavior. We determine how, by testing two
competing hypotheses. One is that group membership operates through social identity, and the
other is that group membership implements a correlation among the actions of in-group members in
response to an implicit signal. We introduce two novel features in the experimental design. The first
feature is the display of group outcomes. This allows us to assess directly the importance of relative
group performance on subjects’ decisions. The second is a careful manipulation of the Dictator game
and the Trust game. More specifically, we choose parameters strategically so as to ensure no change in
the pecuniary incentives across the two games. For a precise quantitative test of the two hypotheses
we develop a structural model to describe an agent’s behavior across treatments. Our findings suggest
that the role of social identity on motivating agents’ decisions has been exaggerated. The display of
group outcomes induces a group effect, but a careful analysis of this effect reveals that participants use
group outcomes as a signal to coordinate in-group members on favorable outcomes. Furthermore, we
find evidence in support of recent experimental studies which demonstrate that an agent’s allocation
choice is sensitive to the behavior of the agent that generated the choice set.
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1 Introduction
The behavior of an agent competing for a monetary reward often runs contrary to the assumptions
of standard microeconomic theory. A substantial body of research suggests that concerns of
equity, reciprocity, trust as well as emotional motives affect significantly the behavior of an agent
(Camerer (2003)). In addition, recent experimental studies provide evidence to suggest that group
membership affects significantly the individual behavior of an agent (see for example, Chen and Li
(2009)). In this study, we determine how group membership alters an agent’s behavioral principles
by testing two competing hypotheses. One hypothesis is that group membership operates through
social identity, and the second hypothesis is that group membership implements a correlation
among the actions of in-group members in response to an implicit signal.
The theoretical premise of social identity is that agents have a desire for positive self-identity.
Esteem for one’s self-identity derives partly from one’s personal qualities (abilities and skills),
but also derives from the social membership to the group with which one is associated. From
this perspective, agents show preferential treatment towards in-group members as a means of
making their own group positively distinct. On the other hand, the second hypothesis tests a
notion that is relatively new in the field. According to this hypothesis, agents respond to implicit
forms of communication by correlating their actions. The notion of implicit communication was
first studied by Roth and Ockenfels (2002) in the context of second-price internet auctions. In
their framework, late-bidders (may) use late-bidding because late bids have a positive probability
of not being successfully transmitted (due to internet traffic congestion). This opens a way for
late-bidders to implicitly collude in order to avoid detrimental bidding wars that would raise the
expected final transaction price. Likewise in the context of laboratory experiments, participants
(may) use features of the experimental design as an implicit form of communication (an implicit
signal) to correlate their actions on favorable outcomes.
Additionally, the study develops a structural model to describe an agent’s conditional behavior
across treatments. Initially, the subjects are divided into two groups based on a trivial criterion.
The subjects then play one of either the Trust game or the Dictator game. Our novel methodology
incorporates group outcomes in the set-up that allow the experimenter to assess directly the
importance of relative group performance on subjects’ decisions. In addition, we choose parameters
strategically so as to ensure no change in the pecuniary incentives across the two games when the
allocator decides on the split. Our framework also incorporates an interaction between group
outcomes and reciprocity in order to provide a more discerning evaluation of the group dynamics.
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The sequential nature of the Trust game allows the first mover’s transfer to infiltrate the second
mover’s choice set and thus facilitates a clear understanding of the role of reciprocity when the
latter interacts with group outcomes. On the other hand, the Dictator game provides the basis
for comparison in the absence of reciprocity.
Overall, our findings suggest that the role of social identity on motivating agents’ decisions
has been exaggerated. Despite the presence of a group effect in the Dictator game and in the
Trust game when group outcomes are displayed, a careful analysis of the results reveals that
participants use group outcomes as a signal to coordinate in-group members on favorable outcomes.
In other words, the display of group outcomes acts as a node of orientation; that is, a device that
harmonizes the expectations of in-group members, reduces uncertainty despite the presence of
imperfect information and finally, coordinates their activities towards favorable outcomes. We
also find evidence in support of recent experimental studies which demonstrate that allocation
choices are sensitive not only to the choice set available to the agent contemplating an action,
but also to the behavior of the agent that generated the choice set. Thus, agents are concerned
not only with the distribution of the material payoff, but also with the process leading up to the
available choices at hand.
The project is novel in several respects. First, the emphasis is not on whether agents interact
differently with in-group and out-group members, but on how group membership affects an agent’s
individual behavior. Second, in answering the question of how an agent’s behavioral principles
are altered, we do not simply survey the literature for candidate hypotheses; instead, we test
competing hypotheses via an array of experimental games. The rest of the paper is organized as
follows. In Section 2, we review the related literature and in Section 3, the experimental design
is presented. In Section 4, the methodology with the specific logit choice model is specified. In
Section 5, we report the important findings while in Section 6, we provide a discussion of the
results and interesting extensions. Finally, in the Conclusion we summarize our findings and offer
direction for future research.
2 Literature Review
Experiments in economics, quite often, foster a conduct that is sharply different from the standard
notion of competitive self-interest. This observation has been culminated in the development
of social preferences models. As of recent, models of social preferences have been extended to
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incorporate the notion of identity in a group-setting (Chen and Li (2009)). Yet, group identity
has been a central topic in social psychology for quite some time now. In the early 1970s, a team
headed by social psychologist Henri Tajfel set up a minimal group, as the control condition, in order
to identify the critical factor(s) responsible for the emergence of in-group preferential treatment.
The minimal group consisted of: (a) a trivial group-assignment, (b) no social interaction, (c)
anonymity, and (d) no trade-off between the decision-maker’s payoff and others’ payoff.1 The
objective of the team was to investigate what extra factors were needed to produce behavior
favoring in-group over out-group members. Surprisingly, the team found out that no additional
factor was needed as participants could still, heavily identify (categorize) with their own group.
A social theory was then proposed to explain this phenomenon. The SIT argues that indi-
viduals have a desire for positive self-identity. Esteem for one’s self-identity derives partly from
one’s own qualities but also derives from the social membership to the group with which one
is associated. Therefore, esteem for one’s group may be positive or negative depending on how
well the in-group compares to relevant out-groups. From this perspective, participants in Tajfel’s
minimal group experiments treated in-group members more favorably than out-group members as
a means of making their own group positively distinct. Yet, in all its success, the theory has been
subjected to some serious criticism based on the realization that the minimal group paradigm was
less minimal than it originally was thought to be. Social psychologists Yamagishi and Kiyonari
(2000) for one, argue that in-group preferential treatment in the minimal group condition occurs
only when expectations of in-group reciprocity, but not of direct reciprocity, are operating. Their
finding is based on a modified Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Even though, agents cooperate more
with an in-group than an out-group member in the simultaneous-move game, the group effect
disappears in the sequential one-shot game. In the latter, the expectation of direct reciprocity is
strong enough to eliminate the group effect. Thus, Yamagishi and Kiyonari infer that participants
in the minimal group experiments do not give preferential treatment to in-group members un-
conditionally; rather, they treat other in-group members favorably only when they expect similar
favorable treatment in return.
In the field of experimental economics, recent research efforts have been primarily focused
on the impact of group identity on agents’ decisions. Many experiments are designed to assess
whether and to what extent, people interact differently with in-group and out-group members.
1The last criterion is often circumvented in economics where most decisions involve some trade-off between one’s
own payoff and the payoffs of others.
3
These experiments use either primed natural identities (such as gender or ethnicity) or induced
identities. The results in the experiments that prime natural identities are mixed (Brown-Kruse
and Hummels (1993), Cadsby and Maynes (1998), Solow and Kirkwood (2002), and Bernhard,
Fehr, and Fischbacher (2006)). On the other hand, in experiments that use induced identities,
the extend to which behavior is affected depends on the strength of group identity. Charness,
Rigotti, and Rustichini (2007) report a series of experiments on the effect of group membership on
individual behavior in Prisoner’s Dilemma and Battle of the Sexes games. The authors manipulate
the saliency of group membership, which leads them to the conclusion that group membership
significantly affects individual behavior when members identify with their group. Yet, when
members do not identify with their group, the rate of cooperation between in-group and out-
group members is not statistically different. Another important contribution to the literature
is the paper by Chen and Li (2009) who use the framework of Charness and Rabin (2002) to
estimate the effect of group identity on subjects’ behavior under two regimes: (a) when the match
receives a higher payoff, and (b) when the match receives a lower payoff. The key finding is that
subjects show an increase in charity concerns when their in-group match receives a lower payoff,
and a decrease in envy when their in-group match receives a higher payoff. In addition, Chen
and Li identify two competing hypotheses that can potentially explain their results. One is social
identity (Tajfel and Turner (1986)) and the other is expectations of generalized reciprocity among
in-group members (Yamagishi and Kiyonari (2000)).
This study contributes to the literature by suggesting a third hypothesis that has been sur-
passed by previous studies: group effects may arise due to correlation amongst the actions of
in-group members in response to implicit forms of communication. Thus far, the literature has
primarily focussed on the impact of explicit (pre-play) communication on agents’ decisions. ?
for example, find out that pre-play communication (plain conversation) in a Matching Pennies
game with three players leads to behavior that is coordinated among subjects. Moreover, their
experimental results suggest that the subjects’ attempt to realize mutual gains naturally leads to
correlated play. Roth and Ockenfels (2002) have been, to our knowledge, the first to incorporate
implicit forms of communication in their model. Roth and Ockenfels indicate that late-bidders
(may) use late-bidding on internet second-price auctions because late bids have a positive prob-
ability of not being successfully transmitted (due to internet traffic congestion). Therefore, late-
bidding opens a way for bidders to implicitly collude in order to avoid detrimental bidding wars
that would raise the expected revenue of the seller.
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3 Experimental Design & Summary Statistics
In what follows, we determine how group membership affects an agent’s individual behavior in an
almost minimal setting; that is, a setting consisting of criteria: (a) a trivial group-assignment, (b)
no social interaction, and (c) anonymity.
3.1 Experimental Design
We hypothesize that the behavior of subjects in an environment where group membership matters
may be influenced in two ways. The first is the observability of group outcomes. The second is the
possibility of reciprocal behavior. To identify the way in which group membership affects agents’
decisions, we implemented a two by two experimental design.2 This results in 4 treatments and
2 controls. In each experimental session there were 16 subjects. The treatment sessions consisted
of three stages. The first stage was a group-assignment stage. In this stage, the participants
were asked to estimate the number of dots on a slide that was flashed in front of their computer
monitors. The division of subjects into the two groups was thus done via a trivial criterion so as
to isolate variables that could potentially cause favoritism ex ante such as face-to-face interaction,
racial background or gender bias. Based on the similarity of the estimates, the participants were
assigned to two groups: Group A and Group B.3 The participants were then privately notified of
their own group identity which they retained for the entire duration of the experimental session.
In the second stage, the subjects had to participate in one of either the Trust game or the Dictator
game. The games were played for 15 rounds. The number of rounds was not communicated to the
subjects. In each round, the subjects had to face a different participant of the same or of different
group identity. With the conclusion of the experimental session, the subjects were paid in private
their cash earnings.4 In the third stage, the subjects were asked to complete a questionnaire.
In the Trust game, one subject had the role of the first mover and the other subject had the
role of the second mover. The subjects’ roles were determined by random draw. The first mover
2The experiments were programmed and conducted with the use of the experimental software z-Tree (Fis-
chbacher (2007)). The detailed instructions are reported in the Supplementary Appendix.
3To ensure an equal split, we grouped the participants who provided an estimate above the median in Group A
and those who provided an estimate at or below the median in Group B. This information was not released to the
participants.
4There was a map of 2 to 1 between the fictional quarters used in the sessions and the actual quarters paid at
the end of the experimental session.
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was initially given an endowment of 4 quarters and was asked to specify an integer amount of
quarters, between zero and 4 quarters inclusive, to transfer to the second mover. Any quarters
that were not transferred to the second mover were secured as profit for the first mover. On the
other hand, the amount of transfer was multiplied by 4 before reaching the second mover. The
second mover was asked next to allocate the new amount. The second mover, regardless of the
first mover’s transfer, had always a constant choice set of five alternatives to choose from. The
choices, together with the corresponding allocation of quarters between the second mover and the
first mover, were explicitly mentioned in the experimental instructions as well as indicated on the
subjects’ computer screens. The round was completed with the earnings of the subject for the
specific round indicated on the screen along with the cumulative earnings of the subject thus far
in the game. In one of the two treatments, the group payoffs were also displayed on a screen,
whereas in the other treatment the group payoffs were not displayed. More specifically, in the
former treatment, the earnings of both, Group A and Group B for the specific round were shown
on a screen right after the screen indicating the cumulative earnings of the subject. The earnings
of each group consisted of a summation of the earnings of each member of the group.
In the Dictator game, one subject had the active role as the dictator and the other subject had
the passive role.5 The subjects’ roles were determined by random draw. The dictator was given
an endowment of quarters and was asked to allocate this endowment between himself and the
passive participant. Even though, different numbers of quarters were provided as endowments,
the dictator would always face a constant choice set of five alternatives. The choices along with
the corresponding allocation of quarters between the dictator and the passive participant were
explicitly mentioned in the experimental instructions as well as indicated on the subjects’ computer
screens. At the end of each round, the earnings of the subject for the specific round were indicated,
as well as the cumulative earnings so far in the game. Analogous to the Trust game, in one of the
two treatments, the group payoffs were also displayed on a screen, whereas in the other treatment
the group payoffs were not displayed.
Finally, the control sessions consisted of two stages. The first stage was the game-play stage,
whereas in the second stage the subjects were asked to complete a questionnaire. In one of the two
controls, the subjects played the Trust game as specified above, whereas in the other control, the
subjects played the Dictator game as specified above. The design of the experiment was otherwise
5To avoid focal-point effects the term “dictator” was replaced by “the participant with the active role” on the
subjects’ computer screens and the instructions.
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identical to the one given above. The experimental sessions were conducted in May of 2010 at
the campus of Florida State University. The subjects were undergraduate students of the Florida
State University. Some general characteristics of the sessions are shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Features of Experimental Sessions
Treatments # of Periods Trial Periods # of Sessions # of Subjects
Trust w/ Group Payoffs 15 1 9 144
Trust w/o Group Payoffs 15 1 6 96
Dictator w/ Group Payoffs 15 2 6 96
Dictator w/o Group Payoffs 15 2 6 96
Control Trust 15 1 3 48
Control Dictator 15 2 3 48
Total 528
3.2 Notation and Payoff Structure
Let i ∈ {1, 2} index the order of the mover in the Trust game. Recall that the first mover in the
Trust game, is asked to specify an integer amount of quarters that is transferred to the second
mover. Let the amount of quarters transferred be denoted as x ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. The second mover
thus receives 4x quarters for any transfer x. Let y ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} be the choice of the second
mover, and let pii denote the payoff of mover i in quarters, where given any transfer x and choice
y, pi2 = (y − 1)× x and pi1 = 3x+ 4− pi2.
On the other hand, in the Dictator game, let i = 1 index the passive subject and let i = 2 index
the dictator. Recall that the dictator is given an endowment. Let the endowment values be denoted
by x˜ ∈ {7, 10, 13, 16}. The values were set so as to establish meaningful comparison between the
Trust game and the Dictator game. Thus, we establish that x˜ = 3x + 4 for x ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} in
order to ensure no change in the pecuniary incentives across the two games. Let y ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
be the choice of the dictator, and let pii denote the payoff of subject i in quarters where given any
endowment x˜ and choice y, pi2 = (y−1)(x˜−4)/3 and pi1 = x˜−pi2. The particular payoff structure
confirms that, not only the cardinality of the choice set is the same for all active participants
across the two games, but also that the monetary payoffs across the two games are the same.
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3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics on the raw experimental data. In particular, the frequency
of the transfer in the Trust game and the choice variables in both, the Dictator and the Trust
game is presented. Notice that in the Dictator game, 82.1% of the subjects acting as dictators
chose to keep the maximum allowable amount. The percentage of dictators who chose to keep the
maximum allowable amount was 87.5% when the latter were matched with out-group members
and 75.9% when matched with in-group members. In addition, it is also worth noticing that
only choices y = 3, y = 4 and y = 5 have a strictly positive number of observations in the
Dictator game. Similarly, we observe differences across group identities in the Trust game. More
specifically, only 27.2% of the first movers transferred more than half of their endowment to out-
group members. On the other hand, the percentage of first movers who transferred more than
half of their endowment to in-group members was 41.4%. Furthermore, 60.7% of second movers
kept the entire allowable amount when matched with an out-group member versus 53.5% when
matched with an in-group member.
Table 3 shows the distribution of each choice y across different treatments. In particular, we
show how the distribution of each choice y changes with the endowment in the Dictator game,
and how it changes with the first mover’s transfer in the Trust game. In the Dictator game,
when the endowment was 7 quarters, over 90% of the dictators chose to keep the entire amount.
This percentage drops when the endowment was 16 quarters. More specifically, the proportion
of dictators who chose to keep the entire amount in the Dictator game treatment without group
payoffs displayed and the Dictator game treatment with group payoffs displayed was 77.7% and
68.1%, respectively. On the other hand, in the Trust game, the percentage change is more radical
and dependent on the magnitude of the transfer. For example, when first movers transferred only
one quarter, then 92.6% of the second movers in the Trust game treatment without group payoffs
displayed and 87.8% of the second movers in the Trust game treatment with group payoffs displayed
chose to keep the entire amount. Yet, when second movers received a transfer of two quarters,
the percentage of them who kept the entire amount drops to 46.9% and 52.2%, respectively. The
percentages remained low when the transfer was 3 quarters and 4 quarters.
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Table 2: Transfer and Choices across Games & Group Identities
Dictator Overall Out-group In-group
Choice y Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
1 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
2 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
3 51 3.5 18 2.3 33 4.9
4 207 14.4 78 10.2 129 19.2
5 1182 82.1 672 87.5 510 75.9
Total 1440 768 672
Trust Overall Out-group In-group
Transfer x Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
0 633 35.2 387 40.3 246 29.3
1 204 11.3 126 13.1 78 9.3
2 354 19.7 186 19.4 168 20.0
3 129 7.2 60 6.3 69 8.2
4 480 26.7 201 20.9 279 33.2
Total 1800 960 840
Trust Overall Out-group In-group
Choice y Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
1 12 1.0 6 1.1 6 1.0
2 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
3 171 14.7 54 9.4 117 19.7
4 318 27.3 165 28.8 153 25.8
5 666 57.1 348 60.7 318 53.5
Total 1167 573 594
Note: Choice of amount kept is conditional on a transfer x > 0.
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Table 3: Distribution of Choice y across Treatments
Dictator game without group payoffs displayed
yx˜ 7 10 13 16
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
1 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
2 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
3 3 2.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 18 6.4
4 6 4.5 30 13.0 9 12.0 45 16.0
5 123 93.2 201 87.0 66 88.0 219 77.7
Dictator game with group payoffs displayed
yx˜ 7 10 13 16
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
1 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
2 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
3 0 0.0 3 1.3 0 0.0 27 9.6
4 9 6.8 36 15.6 9 12.0 63 22.3
5 123 93.2 192 83.1 66 88.0 192 68.1
Trust game without group payoffs displayed
yx 1 2 3 4
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
1 3 3.7 3 2.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
2 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
3 0 0.0 0 0.0 6 7.7 75 32.9
4 3 3.7 75 51.0 42 53.9 60 26.3
5 75 92.6 69 46.9 30 38.5 93 40.8
Trust game with group payoffs displayed
yx 1 2 3 4
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
1 3 2.4 0 0.0 3 5.9 0 0.0
2 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
3 0 0.0 15 7.2 3 5.9 72 28.6
4 12 9.8 84 40.6 15 29.4 27 10.7
5 108 87.8 108 52.2 30 58.8 153 60.7
4 Structural Model
In this section, we outline a simple conceptual two-person model that extends Charness and
Rabin (2002) model to incorporate group identity and reciprocity. The model describes an agent’s
conditional behavior across treatments. Thus, the weights should not be interpreted as stable
characteristics of subjects’ preferences but as behavioral patterns that depend on the particular
environment.
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4.1 Logit Choice Model of Second Movers and Dictators
In the model outlined next, let the utility of a second mover or dictator, s, making choice y be
specified as the following:
U2sy(pi1, pi2) = w1pi1 + (1− w1)pi2 + ξsy, (1)
where ξsy is the idiosyncratic shock of s choosing y. We assume ξsys are identically and indepen-
dently drawn from a Type I extreme value distribution.6 Let w1 denote the weight i = 2 places
on the payoff of i = 1. The weight function is assumed to have the form:
w1j = αj + βjI
where I = 1 if in-group, I = 0 otherwise.
So αj captures the weight i = 2 places on an out-group i = 1, whereas αj + βj captures the
weight placed on an in-group i = 1, and βj captures the weight difference between an out-group
subject and an in-group subject. The two parameters αj and βj vary in the alternatives examined
so as to clearly assess the effect of identity and reciprocity on agents’ decisions. In particular, we
categorize all the observations based on the following criteria:
G = Group payoffs displayed,
N = group payoffs Not displayed,
D = the Dictator game was played,
T = the Trust game was played,
L = transfer was Larger than 2 quarters,
l = transfer was less than or equal to 2 quarters.
6In multinomial logit choice models, error term ξs are identically and independently drawn from a Type I
extreme value distribution with a scale parameter µ. This parameter measures how sensitive utility differences are
to subject choices. When µ = 0, variance of the error term ξ approaches infinity, and the model predicts equal
probability for each of a subject’s choices. When µ becomes arbitrarily large, the error term ξ disappears, and
the probability of choosing the highest utility choice approaches one. However, the scale parameter µ cannot be
identified because of confounding with the vector of utility parameters.
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Due to sample size concerns, we distinguish the choices of transfer into two categories. Thus,
we use index L to indicate that a first mover in the Trust game transfers more than half of his
endowment, and use index l otherwise. The threshold of two quarters is an ex post condition, set
after observing that the median transfer is two quarters (59.17% had transfer ≤ 2). The notation
denoting each alternative j is presented in Table 4.
Table 4: Data Alternatives for Second Mover or Dictator
j Description
ND No group payoffs in Dictator game
GD Group payoffs in Dictator game
NTl No group payoffs in Trust game with transfer less than or equal to 2
NTL No group payoffs Trust game with transfer Larger than 2
GTl Group payoffs Trust game with transfer less than or equal to 2
GTL Group payoffs Trust game with transfer Larger than 2
Given x, let u2(y|x) = w1pi1 + (1−w1)pi2 so that the choice probability for any y = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
has the logit form:
P2(y|x) = exp(u2(y|x))∑5
k=1 exp(u2(k|x))
. (2)
Suppose we observe ny|x occurrences of choice y given transfer x; then, the likelihood function
is:
L2 =
∏
x
∏
y
P2(y|x)ny|x , (3)
and the log likelihood function is:
L˜2 =
∑
x
∑
y
ny|x logP2(y|x). (4)
The estimated α∗j and β
∗
j of a given alternative j maximize the above likelihood function. We can
then compute w∗1j for j = ND, GD, NTl, NTL, GTl, GTL and thus compare the weights across
different alternatives.
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4.2 Logit Choice Model of First Movers
To model the behavior of the first mover we need to make some explicit assumptions. First, we
need to assume that before deciding on the number of quarters transferred to the second mover,
first movers have some prior belief on how the second movers are going to respond. Furthermore,
we assume that the first movers can perfectly predict the second movers’ behavior. In other
words, the first mover’s belief is consistent with the observed probability distribution of the second
movers’ choices. As shown in the previous subsection, we can construct the second mover’s choice
probability P2(y|x) for any given transfer x, from the weight w1 second movers place on first
movers’ payoffs and the observed second movers’ choices y. Third, we assume that the first
movers can also deduce correctly this specific choice probability. Thus, the expected payoff of the
first and second movers for a given x is:
E[pii|x] =
5∑
y=1
P2(y|x)pii(y) for i = 1, 2.
Analogous to the second mover’s utility function, let w2 be the weight the first mover places on
the second mover’s expected payoff. Then, given x, a first mover f has the following specification
of utility:
U1fx(pi1, pi2) = (1− w2)E[pi1|x] + w2E[pi2|x] + ξˆfx (5)
where ξˆfxs are idiosyncratic shocks that are identically and independently drawn from a Type
I extreme value distribution. Notice that weights w2 may vary across first mover’s own choice
of transfer x. This is because first movers expect different responses from the second movers
depending on the transfer. In addition, the game ends when a first mover chooses a transfer of
zero; at this point the first mover knows with certainty that pi1 = 4 and pi2 = 0.
We analogously specify the weight function of first movers in the following fashion:
w2j = αˆj + βˆjI
where I = 1 if in-group, I = 0 otherwise.
Since we are dealing with first movers in only the Trust games, there are only 4 alternatives.
These are NTl, NTL, GTl and GTL as described in Table 4 above. Let u1(x) = (1−w2)E[pi1|x]+
w2E[pi2|x] so that the choice probability of the first mover choosing transfer x = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 is:
P1(x) =
exp(u1(x))∑4
k=0 exp(u1(k))
. (6)
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Next, we construct the log likelihood function of the first mover in a similar manner as that
of the second mover/dictator. Suppose we observe mx occurrences of transfer choice x, then the
log likelihood function is:
L˜1 =
∑
x
mx logP1(x). (7)
The estimated αˆ∗j and βˆj
∗
maximize the above likelihood function. We can then compute w∗2j for
j = NTl, NTL, GTl, GTL, and thus compare the weights across different alternatives.
4.3 General Hypotheses
We hypothesize that the behavior of subjects in an environment where group membership matters
may be influenced in two ways. The first variable is the observability of group outcomes. More
specifically, the experimental design provides a platform that allows subjects to clearly assess their
social ranking before transferring money to in-group and out-group members. Thus, to clearly
assess the significance of social identity on agents’ decisions, our design allows two treatments. In
one treatment, subjects make decisions after observing the group outcomes of last period, whereas
in the other treatment, subjects make decisions without observing the group outcomes of last
period.
The second variable is the possibility of reciprocal behavior. Many recent experimental studies
have demonstrated that agents are concerned not only with the distribution of the material payoff,
but also with the process leading up to the available choices. The impact of group identity is thus
evaluated under two regimes. In the first regime, reciprocity is possible. The sequential nature
of the Trust game allows the first mover’s transfer to infiltrate the second mover’s choice set and
hence facilitates a clear understanding of the role of reciprocity. In the second regime, reciprocity
is not possible. Thus, in the Dictator game, the endowment is decided by the experimenter, while
the dictator decides on the allocation. A crucial element in our design (refer to Section 3.3) is that
the possible sizes of the amount to be allocated by the second mover in the Trust game and by
the dictator in the Dictator game are exactly the same, so as to advance crisp comparison across
the two games.
The introduction of the treatment variables serves two objectives. First, to determine if group
membership in the almost minimal group paradigm can be attributed to social identity or to
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the coordination amongst in-group members in response to an implicit signal. Second, to test
the limitations of the competing hypotheses. This results in the predictions of hypotheses 1 and
2. While hypothesis 1 conveys the implications of social identity independently of the variable
treatments, hypothesis 2 is based on the activation of a signal with the display of group outcomes.
Before explicitly stating the hypotheses, let us denote by wIi the weight placed on the in-group
participant’s payoff, and by wOi the weight placed on the out-group participant’s payoff
Hypothesis 1: Social identity postulates that wIi > w
O
i for i ∈ {1, 2}, regardless of the
observability of group outcomes and/or the possibility of reciprocal behavior.
More specifically, if social identity is salient then, it would ex-ante change the other partici-
pant’s weight. In other words, a subject places a weight on an in-group participant that is ex-ante
higher than that placed on an out-group participant. As a result, whether subjects can observe
group outcomes or not, should not affect the ex-ante favoring of in-group members. Similarly, the
possibility of reciprocal behavior in the Trust game should not affect wIi > w
O
i for i ∈ {1, 2}.
On the other hand, the second hypothesis rests on the display of group outcomes. According
to this hypothesis, a subject places a weight on an in-group participant that is higher than that
placed on an out-group participant, conditional on the display of group outcomes. The second
hypothesis is thus stated as follows.
Hypothesis 2: If agents respond to implicit forms of communication by correlating their
actions on favorable outcomes then, wIi > w
O
i for i ∈ {1, 2}, only when the group outcomes are
displayed.
5 Results
5.1 Results of Second Movers and Dictators
In this section, we report our findings as they pertain to the aspects of conditional behavior
discussed in the previous section. Table 5 reports the estimated parameters αj and βj of the
second movers and the dictators for a given alternative j while controlling for clustering effects.
The standard errors are included in the parentheses. Table 6 provides the weights of the controls
as well as the constructed weights for ND, NTl, and NTL.
15
Table 5: Estimated Parameters for i = 2
Parameter Coefficient Parameter Coefficient
αND 0.141
∗∗∗ βND 0.070
(0.052) (0.053)
αGD 0.081 βGD 0.229
∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.052)
αNTl 0.235
∗∗∗ βNTl -0.148
(0.048) (0.105)
αNTL 0.398
∗∗∗ βNTL 0.024
(0.016) (0.019)
αGTl 0.156
∗∗∗ βGTl 0.020
(0.057) (0.080)
αGTL 0.318
∗∗∗ βGTL 0.098∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.036)
Observations: 2607 Clusters: 432
Table 6: H0: Control Weightj = Out-group/In-group Weightj
D Tl TL
Controls 0.202 0.255 0.399
ND NTl NTL
Out-group 0.141 0.235 0.398
Prob > χ2 0.318 0.827 0.973
In-group 0.211 0.087 0.423
Prob > χ2 0.857 0.150 0.357
The weights in the controls are not statistically different from the corresponding weights of
in-group and out-group members when the group payoffs are not displayed. More specifically,
in the Dictator control, the weight on the other participant’s payoff is 0.202, compared to 0.211
when the dictator is paired with an in-group member and 0.141 when the dictator is paired with
an out-group member. Notice that if social identity was, in fact, salient, then, dictators should
have reduced significantly the weight placed on the passive out-group participants. Recall that
the Dictator has an endowment that is to be allocated between the dictator and another member
16
who might be in-group or out-group. Thus, if a dictator cares about group performance, then he
should make a deliberate effort to decrease the out-group participant’s allocation. Yet, dictators
do not reduce significantly the weight placed on the passive out-group participant. This finding
thus provides initial evidence to refute the social identity hypothesis. In addition, there exist
no significant differences in the weight placed on first movers in the Trust control, compared to
the weights placed on either in-group or out-group members regardless of the amount of transfer.
These findings are summarized in our first result.
RESULT 1: Categorizing subjects into groups is not sufficient to cause in-group preferential treat-
ment nor discrimination against out-group members.
In Table 7, we construct the weights w1j for each alternative j. A group effect is defined as the
significant difference between the weight placed on an in-group member’s payoff and the weight
placed on an out-group member’s payoff, for a given alternative j; alternatively, a group effect
can be defined as a rejection of the H0: Out-group Weightj = In-group Weightj. Looking at
the alternatives where group payoffs are not displayed (that is, ND, NTl, and NTL), we find
no evidence in support of the existence of a group effect. Subjects, do not differentiate between
members of different groups when it comes to the allocation of monetary rewards, if group payoffs
are not displayed. On the other hand, there is evidence to support a group effect in two alternatives
when group payoffs are displayed. These are the alternatives GD and GTL. The presence of a
group effect in these two alternatives provides evidence in support of the second hypothesis. Recall
that the second hypothesis states that wIi > w
O
i for i ∈ {1, 2}, only when the group outcomes are
displayed. In addition, it is important to notice that there exists no group effect in the alternative
GTl. Thus, in games of reciprocity, the activation of signals via the display of group payoffs is
conditional on the preceding agent’s actions.
Table 7: H0: Out-group Weightj = In-group Weightj
ND GD NTl GT l NTL GTL
Out-group 0.141 0.081 0.235 0.156 0.398 0.318
In-group 0.211 0.311 0.087 0.176 0.423 0.416
Prob > χ2 0.191 0.000 0.157 0.201 0.802 0.007
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At this point, it will be useful to our understanding of the implications of the incorporation of
group payoffs into the experimental design, if we tested two additional statistical hypotheses. The
first hypothesis tests H0: Out-group Weightj w/o Group Payoffs = Out-group Weightj w/ Group
Payoffs, and the second hypothesis tests H0: In-group Weightj w/o Group Payoffs = In-group
Weightj w/ Group Payoffs. The results are reported in Table 8.
Table 8: H0: Out/In-group Weightj w/o Group Payoffs = Out/In-group Weightj w/ Group Payoffs
Out-group In-group Out-group In-group Out-group In-group
ND 0.141 0.211 NTl 0.235 0.087 NTL 0.398 0.423
GD 0.081 0.311 GTl 0.156 0.176 GTL 0.318 0.416
P > χ2 0.461 0.027 P > χ2 0.293 0.384 P > χ2 0.037 0.761
Consider first the alternatives in the Dictator games. The out-group weights across the two
Dictator treatments are not statistically different. Thus, dictators do not alter their allocation
decisions with the display of group payoffs, when paired with an out-group participant. On
the other hand, the in-group weights are statistically different across the two Dictator treatments,
which indicates that dictators are more generous to in-group participants conditional on the display
of group payoffs. Consider next, the alternatives in the Trust games with a transfer that is more
than half the endowment of the first movers. The significance tests indicate that the in-group
weights across the two Trust treatments with a transfer that is more than half the endowment
of the first mover is not statistically different. Yet, the counterpart out-group weights are, in
fact, statistically different. In other words, second movers act opportunistically to increase their
monetary payoff by exploiting the trust of out-group first movers. The latter findings uncover
clearly the implications of the incorporation of group payoffs into the experimental design. These
findings are captured in our second result.
RESULT 2: The display of group payoffs is a signal that coordinates in-group members on
favorable outcomes. More specifically, in the GD, the display of payoffs coordinates in-group mem-
bers to allocate more to each other. In addition, in the GTL, the display of group payoffs leads
second movers to act opportunistically in order to increase their monetary payoffs at the expense
of the out-group first movers who entrusted them.
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To get a more comprehensive idea of the underlying mechanics of the games, we also run
statistical tests to determine the role of a transfer that was more than half the endowment of the
first mover. Thus, we test the hypothesis H0: Out/In-group Weightj of Transfer > 2 = Out/In-
group Weightj of Transfer ≤ 2. The results are reported in Table 9. Clearly, a transfer of more
than half the endowment is significant in all the alternatives considered. Thus, we find evidence
in support of recent experimental studies which demonstrate that allocation choices are sensitive
not only to the choice set available to the agent contemplating an action, but also to the behavior
of the agent that generated the choice set. Agents are, therefore, concerned not only with the
distribution of the material payoff, but also with the process leading up to the available choices
at hand. Our third result is thus summarized as follows:
RESULT 3: A first mover’s trust is reciprocated by the second mover, independently of the first
mover’s group identity.
Table 9: H0: Out/In-group Weightj of Transfer > 2 = Out/In-group Weightj of Transfer ≤ 2
Control Out-group In-group Out-group In-group
T l 0.255 NTl 0.235 0.087 GTl 0.156 0.176
TL 0.399 NTL 0.398 0.423 GTL 0.318 0.416
P > χ2 0.037 P > χ2 0.000 0.000 P > χ2 0.006 0.000
5.2 Results of First Movers
Table 10 reports the estimated parameters αˆj and βˆj of the first movers for a given alternative
j while controlling for clustering effects. The standard errors are included in the parentheses.
Table 11 provides the weights of the controls as well as the constructed weights for NTl and
NTL. The weights in the controls are not statistically different from the corresponding weights
of in-group and out-group members when the group payoffs are not displayed, controlling for the
amount transferred. More specifically, there exist no significant differences in the weight placed on
first movers in the Trust control, compared to the weights placed on either in-group or out-group
members when controlling for the amount of transfer.
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Table 10: Estimated Parameters for i = 1
Parameter Coefficient Parameter Coefficient
αˆNTl 0.119
∗ βˆNTl 0.001
(0.066) (0.085)
αˆNTL 0.067 βˆNTL −0.015
(0.041) (0.019)
αˆGTl −0.020 βˆGTl 0.112∗∗
(0.051) (0.053)
αˆGTL 0.110
∗∗∗ βˆGTL −0.100∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.008)
Observations: 1800 Clusters: 240
Table 11: H0: Control Weightj = Out-group/In-group Weightj
T l TL
Control −0.011 0.080
NTl NTL
Out-group 0.119 0.067
Prob > χ2 0.362 0.860
In-group 0.120 0.052
Prob > χ2 0.382 0.743
In Table 12, we construct the weights w2j for each alternative j. In general, first movers attach
low weights to second movers’ payoffs. This indicates that first movers are primarily concerned
with their own monetary payoff. It is noteworthy, that a negative weight is, in-fact, possible.7
Looking at the alternatives where group payoffs are not displayed (that is NTl and NTL), we find
no evidence in support of the existence of a group effect. Subjects, do not differentiate between
members of different groups when making transfer decisions in expectation, if group payoffs are not
displayed. On the other hand, there is evidence to support a group effect in two alternatives when
group payoffs are displayed. The two alternatives are GTl and GTL. Interestingly enough, the
two alternatives have opposite implications for the second mover. More specifically, in GTl, first
movers significantly favor an in-group second mover, whereas in the GTL, first movers significantly
7The weights were not restricted to non-negative values a priori.
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favor an out-group second mover. Second movers are expected to allocate significantly more to
in-group first movers in the second stage of the GTL game. Therefore, favorable transfers by
in-group first movers in GTL can be explained more by first mover’s pecuniary interests than
their altruistic feelings towards in-group second movers. This further suggests that social identity
is inactive.
Table 12: H0: Out-group Weightj = In-group Weightj
NTl GT l NTL GTL
Out-group 0.119 −0.020 0.067 0.110
In-group 0.120 0.092 0.052 0.009
Prob > χ2 0.992 0.036 0.727 0.008
To get a more comprehensive idea of the underlying mechanics of the games, we also run
statistical tests to determine the role of a transfer that was more than half the endowment of the
first mover. Thus, we test the hypothesis H0: Out/In-group Weightj of Transfer > 2 = Out/In-
group Weightj of Transfer ≤ 2. The results are reported in Table 13. We observe a significant
difference only in the out-group weights when group payoffs are displayed. This result corroborates
with the results in Table 12. First movers attach a higher weight to out-group second movers when
the former transfer more than half their endowment, in anticipation that the out-group second
movers will keep most of the new amount.
Table 13: H0: Out/In-group Weightj of Transfer > 2 = Out/In-group Weightj of Transfer ≤ 2
Control Out-group In-group Out-group In-group
T l -0.011 NTl 0.119 0.120 GTl −0.020 0.092
TL 0.080 NTL 0.067 0.052 GTL 0.110 0.009
P > χ2 0.568 P > χ2 0.482 0.500 P > χ2 0.042 0.321
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6 Discussion
6.1 Behavior of First Movers
In this subsection, we discuss the behavior of the first movers in the Trust game. Theoretically, if
a second mover only cares about maximizing his own payoff, then his best response is to always
keep everything, independently of the magnitude of the first mover’s transfer. Thus, contingent
on this profit maximizing assumption, the only Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) in
the Trust game is for the first mover to transfer zero in expectation of the second mover’s best
response.
Table 14: Actual Observed First Mover Behavior
Trust w/o Trust w/
Out-group Group Payoffs Group Payoffs
Transfer Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
0 105 27.3 282 49.0
1 42 10.9 84 14.6
2 90 23.4 96 16.7
3 54 14.1 6 1.0
4 93 24.2 108 18.8
Total/Avg. 384 576
Trust w/o Trust w/
In-group Group Payoffs Group Payoffs
Transfer Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
0 81 24.1 165 32.7
1 39 11.6 39 7.7
2 57 17.0 111 22.0
3 24 7.1 45 8.9
4 135 40.2 144 28.57
Total/Avg. 336 504
In Table 14, we present the summary statistics of the choices of the first mover under each
treatment for both in-group and out-group pairings. It is noteworthy that first movers transfer,
on average, more to in-group than to out-group members, independently of the treatment. Fur-
thermore, the presence of group outcomes reduces the average transfer to, both, in-group and
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out-group participants. In addition, a high percentage of first movers choose the extremes; that
is, first movers either transfer nothing or transfer all 4 quarters. Around 20% of the first movers
choose to transfer half their endowment while, relatively, few participants choose to transfer 1 or
3 quarters.
Table 15: Expected Payoffs in the Trust Game From the Descriptive Prediction
Trust w/o Trust w/
Out-group Group Payoffs Group Payoffs
Transfer E[pi1|x] E[pi2|x] E[pi1|x] E[pi2|x]
0 4.00 0.00 4.00 0.00
1 3.07 3.93 3.18 3.82
2 3.33 6.67 3.19 6.81
3 3.17 9.83 4.00 9.00
4 3.23 12.77 1.11 14.89
Trust w/o Trust w/
In-group Group Payoffs Group Payoffs
Transfer E[pi1|x] E[pi2|x] E[pi1|x] E[pi2|x]
0 4.00 0.00 4.00 0.00
1 3.08 3.92 3.08 3.92
2 2.74 7.26 3.03 6.97
3 2.88 10.13 2.40 10.60
4 4.00 12.00 3.92 12.08
Note: Max Highlighted
Alternatively, suppose that every first mover can perfectly observe the distribution of all second
movers’ choices y. Then, a first mover can calculate the probability of a second mover’s choice y
given the first mover’s transfer x, P (y|x) as:
P (y|x) = ny|x
mx
,
where ny|x is the number of times the second movers chose option y when the first mover’s transfer
was x quarters; and mx is the number of times the first movers chose to transfer x quarters. Then,
the expected payoff of the second mover is E[pi2|x] =
∑5
y=1(y−1) ·x ·P (y|x), whereas the expected
payoff of the first mover is E[pi1|x] =
∑5
y=1 4 + 3x− ((y− 1) ·x ·P (y|x)). We present the expected
payoffs E[pi1|x] and E[pi2|x] in Table 15.
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Table 16: Expected Payoffs in the Trust Game From the Structural Model Prediction
Trust w/o Trust w/
Out-group Group Payoffs Group Payoffs
Transfer E[pi1|x] E[pi2|x] E[pi1|x] E[pi2|x]
0 4.00 0.00 4.00 0.00
1 4.05 2.95 3.85 3.15
2 3.01 6.99 2.67 7.33
3 3.83 9.17 2.44 10.55
4 2.84 13.16 1.20 14.80
Trust w/o Trust w/
In-group Group Payoffs Group Payoffs
Transfer E[pi1|x] E[pi2|x] E[pi1|x] E[pi2|x]
0 4.00 0.00 4.00 0.00
1 3.70 3.30 3.89 3.11
2 2.47 7.53 2.74 7.26
3 4.45 8.55 4.27 8.73
4 3.72 12.28 3.46 12.54
Note: Max Highlighted
Had the sample size been large, the above descriptive prediction of expected payoffs would
have been unbiased via an application of the law of large numbers. Yet, due to the limited sample
size of our experimental data, we also construct the expected payoffs using the structural model
introduced in Section 4. The expected payoffs of the structural model is presented in Table 16.
It is noteworthy that the descriptive statistics of Table 14 indicate that more than 50% of first
movers chose to transfer more than zero quarters to out-group second movers. This statistic shows
that first movers are altrusitic towards out-group members. The structural estimation of the first
movers’ weights on second movers’ payoffs is thus in line with the descriptive statistic of Table
14. On the other hand, first movers attain the maximum expected payoff (> 4 quarters) when
they choose to transfer 3 quarters to an in-group member, regardless of whether group outcomes
are shown. Referring back to Table 14, we observe that less than 50% of first movers, when
group outcomes were not displayed, and less than 40% of first movers, when group outcomes were
displayed, chose to transfer more than half their endowment to in-group second movers. This
provides evidence of risk aversion on the part of the first movers. Thus, first movers are willing
to give up 1 to 2 quarters in expected payoff in order to secure a certain payoff of 4 quarters.
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6.2 Evolution of Choices
We use the following regression to illustrate the evolution of the first mover i’s transfer x in period
t of the Trust game sessions.
xit = λˆ+ γˆ1 · Period + γˆ2 · Period× I + εˆit
Table 17: Evolution of First Mover’s Transfer in Trust Game
Coefficients All NT GT
Constant(λˆ) 2.132∗∗∗ 2.453∗∗∗ 1.917∗∗∗
(0.136) (0.214) (0.171)
Period (γˆ1) −0.075∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗ −0.088∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.026) (0.021)
Period×I (γˆ2) 0.067∗∗∗ 0.029 0.092∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.022) (0.018)
Note: *** P < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, * P < 0.1
The regression results are reported in Table 17. The coefficient γˆ1 captures the evolution of
transfer across periods when the first mover is paired with an out-group participant. On the
other hand, the evolution of transfer when the first mover is paired with an in-group participant
is γˆ1 + γˆ2. Thus, the coefficient γˆ2 captures the difference in the evolution of transfer between
a second mover that is in-group and one that is out-group. We observe that first movers are
progressively transferring less to out-group participants since γˆ1 is significantly negative in both
Trust game treatments. In addition, the coefficient γˆ2 is only significant when the group payoffs
are displayed. We test whether γˆ1 + γˆ2 is significantly different from zero, and the test results are
presented in Table 18. We see that the change in transfer is not significant when the first-mover
is faced with an in-group participant.
Table 18: H0: γˆ1 + γˆ2 = 0
All NT GT
γˆ1 + γˆ2 -0.008 -0.028 0.004
Prob > F 0.609 0.297 0.844
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We use the following OLS to illustrate the evolution in subject i’s choice y of amount kept in
period t.
yit = λ+ γ1 · Period + γ2 · Period× I + εit
Table 19: Evolution of Second Mover/Dictator’s Choice y
Coefficients All ND GD NT GT
Constant (λ) 4.517∗∗∗ 4.799∗∗∗ 4.776∗∗∗ 4.002∗∗∗ 4.418∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.062) (0.070) (0.119) (0.108)
Period (γ1) 0.021
∗∗∗ 0.004 0.008 0.042∗∗∗ 0.027∗
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.015) (0.016)
Period×I (γ2) −0.017∗∗∗ −0.003 −0.021∗∗∗ −0.002 −0.036∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.013)
Note: *** P < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, * P < 0.1
The regression results are reported in Table 19. The coefficient γ1 captures the evolution of
amount-kept choices across periods when subject i = 2 is paired with an out-group participant. On
the other hand, the evolution of choice when subject i = 2 is paired with an in-group participant
is γ1 + γ2. Thus, the coefficient γ2 captures the difference in the evolution of choices between a
subject i = 1 that is in-group and one that is out-group. We observe that the coefficient γ1 is not
significantly different from zero in the Dictator game, but it is significantly positive for both Trust
game treatments; the latter result, indicates that subjects keep more as the game progresses. The
coefficient γ2 is not significantly different from zero when group payoffs are not displayed, but it
is significantly negative when group payoffs are displayed. We test whether γ1 + γ2 is significantly
different from zero, and the test results are presented in Table 20. We see that the change in the
choice of amount kept is not significant when a subject is paired with an in-group participant,
with the exception of the Trust game with no group payoffs displayed (significantly positive).
Table 20: H0: γ1 + γ2 = 0
All ND GD NT GT
γ1 + γ2 0.004 0.001 -0.014 0.040 -0.008
Prob > F 0.511 0.932 0.112 0.009 0.534
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6.3 Questionnaires
Our overall findings indicate that the role of social identity in motivating agents’ decisions has
been exaggerated. Yet, this could be attributed to a weak group manipulation. Thus, here, we
report results on the participants’ attachment to in-group and out-group members to determine
whether or not the group manipulation was, in-fact, weak. In the post-experimental questionnaire,
the participants’ degree of attachment was measured on a scale from 1 to 10. The results are
shown in Table 21. All of the group attachment-differences are statistically significant across the
four treatments. These results demonstrate the success in the manipulation of the treatments:
participants felt more closely-attached to an in-group than an out-group participant. Thus, the
ineffectiveness of social identity in influencing agents’ decisions can not be attributed to failure in
invoking group identity across the different treatments.
Table 21: H0: Mean Out-group Attachment = Mean In-group Attachment
Dictator w/o Dictator w/ Trust w/o Trust w/
Group Payoffs Group Payoffs Group Payoffs Group Payoffs
Out-group 1.938 2.344 2.531 2.563
(0.265) (0.350) (0.370) (0.285)
In-group 2.844 3.719 3.500 4.083
(0.315) (0.463) (0.409) (0.363)
Pr(|T | > |t|) 0.032 0.021 0.084 0.001
7 Conclusion
This paper reports findings from laboratory experiments in an almost minimal group setting, that
investigate how group membership affects an agent’s individual behavior. More specifically, the
study tests two competing hypotheses. One is that group membership operates through social
identity, and the other is that group membership implements a correlation among the actions
of the in-group members in response to the display of group payoffs. The study also develops a
structural model to describe an agent’s conditional behavior across treatments.
Our results suggest that the role of social identity on motivating agents’ decisions has been
exaggerated. Despite the presence of in-group favoritism in the Dictator game when group out-
comes are displayed, a careful analysis of the results reveals that in-group favoritism is manifested
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as favorable in-group treatment in response to the display of group outcomes. In addition, in the
Trust game with group outcomes displayed, second movers discriminate against out-group first
movers who transfer more than half of their endowment to them. Thus, second movers seize the
opportunity to increase their monetary payoff at the expense of the out-group first movers who
entrusted them. In all other contexts, there is no evidence in support of differential treatment
despite the success in the manipulation of the treatments as indicated in the post-experimental
questionnaires. We thus propose that participants use group outcomes as a coordinating device to
align the expectations of in-group members, reduce uncertainty despite the presence of imperfect
information and finally, to coordinate their activities towards favorable outcomes. Finally, we find
evidence in support of recent experimental studies which demonstrate that allocation choices are
sensitive not only to the choice set available to the agent contemplating an action, but also to the
behavior of the agent that generated the choice set.
Our hopes are that the findings gleaned from these experiments, will eventually be applied to a
variety of economic and social settings. Some selected applications could be: auctions, attitudes of
consumers towards different tax schemes, and employee response to changes in wages. In addition,
our findings will enable researchers in the future to, also, examine identity-based behaviors across
space and time. The researchers for example, could consider why notions of “class” or “race”
vary across countries; why might gender and racial integration vary across industries; what might
explain the rise and fall of ethnic tensions.
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